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Abstract
This paper reports the results of a meta-study of 96 prisoner’s dilemma studies comprising
more than 3500 participants. We disentangle the role of “risk” (to cooperate unilaterally) and
“temptation” (to defect against a cooperator) and find that (i) an index of risk best explains
the variation in cooperation rates across one-shot games, while (ii) an index of temptation
best explains the variation in finitely repeated games. Risk and temptation indices also affect
gender comparisons. Women are more cooperative than the average man if risk is low and less
cooperative if risk is high. There are no gender differences on average.
JEL Codes: C72, C90, D01, D70.
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The prisoner’s dilemma has been studied for over 50 years in areas as diverse as Biology, Eco-
nomics, Political Science, Physics, Psychology or Sociology as a workhorse to understand civic be-
haviour or why people cooperate in social dilemma situations. Social dilemma situations involve a
tension between self and group interest that is at the heart of many interactions including effort
provision in teams, tax compliance, public good provision or simply good citizenship behaviour.
Achieving and maintaining high rates of cooperation in (many of) these situations seems central to
create well functioning societies. In the literature different theories of human cooperation have been
proposed (Dresher, 1961; Kreps et al., 1982; Axelrod, 1984; Hamerstein, 2003; Fischbacher et al.,
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2001) and different factors favourable or unfavourable to cooperation have been studied in labora-
tory experiments (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Andreoni and Varian, 1999; Bereby-Meyer and Roth,
2006; Grimm and Mengel, 2009; Friedman and Oprea, 2012). Despite this long history of research
using the prisoner’s dilemma, there is still no agreement on why people cooperate and on how repe-
tition (the number of stages and matches) affects cooperation (Normann and Wallace, 2012; Embrey
et al., 2016). Another open question concerns gender differences in cooperation (Croson and Gneezy,
2009).
In this paper we try to organize existing evidence by disentangling the role of “risk” (to cooperate
unilaterally) and “temptation” (to defect against a cooperator), the two defining properties of the
prisoner’s dilemma. We measure temptation by the percentage gain when unilaterally defecting
against a cooperator (TEMPT) and risk by the percentage loss of unilaterally cooperating against a
defector (RISK).1 Understanding which of the two motives is more important for cooperation failure
can help decide in which of two games higher cooperation rates can be expected, which can in turn
inform the design of mechanisms and policy. It can also help discriminate between theories and
inform new theory creation, as we discuss in more detail below. A second aim of the paper is to
understand to which extent seemingly contradictory results in the literature can be explained along
these two dimensions.
Our analysis is based on a meta-study of 96 prisoner’s dilemma studies (combinations of payoff
parameters, number of stages and matches) with more than 3500 participants across 6 countries.
Studies include one-shot settings (including random rematching) and finitely repeated games with
the 2×2 prisoner’s dilemma as the stage game. Average cooperation rates across these 96 studies
range from 0.04 to 0.84 with a mean of about 0.35.
We find that RISK best explains variation in cooperation rates across random matching and one-
shot treatments, where people have no prior experience with their matches and hence face substantial
uncertainty. Neither TEMPT, nor a measure of efficiency nor any of eleven other indices used in previous
literature can explain this variation once RISK is controlled for. RISK also explains more of the
1On top of the requirements that RISK> 0 and TEMPT> 0, often a third condition is assumed in the prisoner’s
dilemma namely that mutual cooperation yields higher payoffs than mutual defection (efficiency gains). Without this
condition there is no tension between individual and social rationality. We will control for possible efficiency gains
using a variable we call EFF . If TEMPT= 0, then the prisoner’s dilemma becomes a stag hunt game and if RISK= 0 it is
a Hawk Dove game. If RISK , TEMPT and EFF are all zero then the game is a trivial game where all payoffs are equal.
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variation in average cooperation rates by itself than any of the other indices.
Results are different in the repeated game condition. Here RISK plays a minor role and, if at all,
it is our measure of temptation (TEMPT) that can explain variation in cooperation rates. However,
a number of other indices from the literature play a role as well in the partner setting. When we
compare RISK , TEMPT , efficiency and eleven other indices from the literature in terms of the share
of the variation in cooperation rates they explain, we find that TEMPT explains variation well when
the length of the game is accounted for. Otherwise other indices from the literature perform better.
We then ask whether seemingly contradictory results in the literature can be understood in
terms of RISK and TEMPT. We first focus on the comparison between “partner” (repeated game) and
“stranger” (one-shot) settings and find that overall there is no difference in cooperation rates between
the two settings. There is more cooperation in “partner” than “stranger” if and only if RISK is high
(above median) and TEMPT is low (below median). Interestingly, this differs from findings by Zelmer
(2003) who finds that there is more cooperation (higher contributions) overall in “partner” than in
“stranger” in the related public good game. In Section 3 we discuss possible explanations for this
difference.
We also find that women are more cooperative than the average man if and only if RISK is low
and less cooperative if and only if RISK is high, but there are no gender differences on average
across the studies considered. The fact that both these comparisons are mediated by the RISK and
TEMPT measures could be one explanation for why previous literature (usually relying on one set of
payoff parameters) has found such mixed results (see Andreoni and Croson (2008) or Croson and
Gneezy (2009) for surveys).2
Disentangling the role of risk and temptation in social dilemma situations can help decide in
which of two games higher cooperation rates can be expected, which can in turn inform the design
of mechanisms and policy. If e.g. two game forms Γ1 and Γ2 present the same level of efficiency, but
2Andreoni and Croson (2008) summarize some of the research on the “partner” vs “stranger” question in a handbook
article on the public good game. In the prisoner’s dilemma Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996) found
more cooperation in the “partner” condition, Boone et al. (1999) found no difference and Andreoni (1988) found more
cooperation in the stranger setting. Dal Bo (2005) find more cooperation in the “partner” condition with a long
horizon in the repeated game and no difference with a short horizon of the repeated game. See also the more detailed
discussion of differences between these papers in Section 4. Most articles on the prisoner’s dilemma we found do not
contain data on both the “partner” and the “stranger” case. The findings on gender are consistent with evidence in
Simpson (2003), who argues precisely that the reason why existing literature on the prisoner’s dilemma has, by and
large, not found gender differences is because of the presence of both temptation and risk in these games. See also
Kuwabara (2006).
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Γ1 has higher RISK and lower TEMPT compared to Γ2, then our results suggest that Γ2 may be more
conducive to high cooperation rates than Γ1 in one-shot (stranger) settings, while the reverse would be
true in the repeated game. It can also help discriminate between theories of cooperation. Our results
show, for example, that theories focused on risk, such as e.g. theories of conditional cooperation,
should have good chances to explain behaviour in one-shot games. Those theories assume that agents
are intrinsically motivated to cooperate as long as others do so as well (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
On the other hand, theories focused on creating incentives for cooperation (or avoiding temptation),
should have better chances in the repeated game. Results can also help policy-makers to understand
which aspect of the dilemma is best targeted to design more effective interventions. For example,
interventions focused on reducing strategic uncertainty should be more effective in one-shot (random
rematching) games, where risk explains most of the variation in cooperation rates.3
The question of how indices derived from payoff parameters can predict cooperation rates in the
prisoner’s dilemma has attracted a lot of research in the late 1970-ies and 1980-ies. Much of this
research is summarized in Murnighan and Roth (1983). The focus of this literature was not so much
to disentangle the role of risk and temptation, but rather to find one index, which typically mixes
risk, temptation and efficiency, that is able to “summarize” incentives in the prisoner’s dilemma.
In Section 3 we compare the performance of our measures of risk and temptation with the indices
proposed in this literature in terms of explaining variation in cooperation rates. We find that,
particularly in the stranger condition, the separation between motives works much better with our
measure of risk outperforming all other indices. In a more recent study, Schmidt et al. (2001) compare
the impact of payoff parameters in six different experimental games using two “stranger” designs with
exogenous and endogenous matching (where players can choose their match based on the history of
play) and one “partner” setting with endogenous matching. They focus on three indices, called
“greed”, “fear” and “cooperator’s gain”, which correspond to the numerators of our indices TEMPT ,
RISK and EFF. Variation in these parameters is low, though, with RISK ranging from 0.66 to 0.83 and
TEMPT ranging from 0.18 to 0.36. They find that cooperation rates correlate with all three indices,
3To the extent that communication reduces strategic uncertainty, this could explain for example why pre-play
communication is often found to increase cooperation rates in these settings (see e.g. the meta study of Balliet
(2010) or Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhury (2011) for surveys on the related public good game). Other examples of
interventions designed to reduce temptation could include taxation schemes, with very progressive schemes better
suited to curb temptation compared to linear schemes.
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but do not find systematic differences across their different designs. In a class of prisoner’s dilemma
games Capraro et al. (2014) find that the “benefit to cost ratio” increases cooperation rates. Other
authors have studied similar notions in public good or trust games. Dawes and Thaler (1988) try
to disentangle “greed” and “fear” in 7-player public good games. Their treatment manipulation for
greed is different from what we call temptation. Snijders and Keren (1999) study the importance of
risk and temptation by varying payoff parameters in (one-shot) trust games. They find that potential
losses for a trustor are important in determining behaviour, which seems to indicate that risk might
play an important role in this game.
Two previous meta-studies on the prisoner’s dilemma have focused on language and commu-
nication. Sally (1995) focuses on early experiments (1958-1992) and concludes that decisions are
“usually inconsistent with a model of pure self interest” and that language used in the instructions
seems to encourage cooperation. Balliet (2010) finds that pre-play (especially face-to-face) commu-
nication increases cooperation. To the extent that we interpret communication as reducing strategic
uncertainty this is consistent with our results. Balliet et al. (2011) conduct a meta-study focused on
sex-differences in cooperation. Consistent with our evidence, they find that there are no differences
on average between cooperation rates of men and women. They do find, however, that men cooperate
more in repeated interactions. We do not find evidence of the latter. They also find that male-male
interactions are more cooperative than female-female interactions and that women cooperate more in
mixed interactions. We cannot say anything about this question, since in all the studies we consider
participants do not know the gender or sex of their opponent. By contrast, Balliet et al. (2011) do
not analyze how gender differences are mediated by risk and temptation. In a recent meta study
Embrey et al. (2016) ask whether behaviour in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (“partner”
setting) is consistent with backward induction. They find that the mean time to first defection is
predicted well by a “basin of attraction” index which combines elements of risk and temptation. We
include this index in our analysis and find that it can also explain a substantial part of the variation
in average cooperation rates in the repeated game. Rezaei Khavas (2016) studies the effect of culture
on cooperation rates in the prisoner’s dilemma. A meta-study on indefinitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma games is provided by Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2016).4
4There are also some meta-studies on the related public good game. Croson and Marks (2000) focus on threshold
public goods and show that higher step returns (analogous to marginal per capita returns in the linear public good
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we explain how we collected our data both from
existing literature and from additional lab experiments we conducted. We also define and discuss
our measures RISK and TEMPT. In Section 2 we present our main results. In Section 3 we discuss how
they compare to the indices used by Murnighan and Roth (1983) and Embrey et al. (2016). Section
4 studies dynamics and Section 5 exploits questionnaire data using subsets of of our full data set for
which this additional information is available. Section 6 concludes. Additional tables and figures can
be found in an Online Appendix.
1 The meta study
1.1 Procedures
We study laboratory experiments on prisoner’s dilemma games. Our data set comprises 96 studies
involving more than 3500 participants in experiments conducted in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, the UK and the USA. A “study” S = (Π, T,M,X) is defined by a combination of payoff matrix
Π ∈

 a b
c d
 |a, b, c, d ∈ R
, the length of the game (number of stages) T ∈ N, the number of
matches M ∈ N and an indicator X for the paper from which the data are taken. Hence two
independent observations of the same paper (with the same (Π, T,M)) would be part of the same
“study”, while two observations with the same (Π, T,M) that are part of different papers would
constitute two different “studies”.
Our data set contains 57 such studies stemming from 23 research papers in the existing literature
published between 1967 and 2013. Our criteria for inclusion are that (i) a (two player) 2x2 prisoner’s
dilemma is studied (no public good game or similar), (ii) the game is either one-shot or finitely
repeated (not indefinitely repeated), (iii) matching is either “partner”, i.e. finitely repeated or
“stranger”, i.e. random rematching (no networks etc.) with a finite number of matches, (iv) matching
is exogenous, (v) there is no pre-play communication nor other stages, such as punishment, in the
game, (vi) choices are incentivized, (vii) there is no deception of experimental participants, (viii) the
game) lead to more cooperation. Zelmer (2003) focuses on the linear public good game and finds that returns as well
as framing, communication, partner matchings and the use of children as subjects had a positive effect on cooperation.
Habetinova and Suetens (2015) focus on the role of feedback in public goods and oligopoly games.
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cooperation rate is either reported, data were made available to check it or it could be reasonably
inferred from a graph and (ix) the study has been published before or in 2013.5 We found studies
via a keyword search on google scholar and via an e-mail to the ESA discussion group on January
6, 2014. Two papers (7 studies) were included after being suggested by a Reviewer. All the studies
are listed in Table A3 in Online Appendix A. Note that often the main treatments of a paper don’t
satisfy our criteria listed above, but there is a control treatment that does. Such treatments are, of
course, only included if they stem from between subject designs or if there is little risk that the data
could be “contaminated” by subsequent treatments.
In addition, we conducted our own lab experiments to cover a larger parameter space (16 studies).
In our own experiments we conducted 10 period prisoner’s dilemma games in either a repeated game
setting (T = 10;M = 1) or a random rematching setting (T = 1;M = 10). We also conducted some
one-shot studies (T = 1;M = 1) on Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMT (23 studies). Lab Studies were
conducted between December 2013 - January 2014 at EssexLab at the University of Essex. AMT
studies were conducted between November 2013 - January 2014.
Figure 1 illustrates the variation in our two variables of interest, RISK and TEMPT, for existing
studies (Figure 1(a)) and after adding both our own lab studies and studies on AMT (Figure 1(b)).
Figure 1(a) shows that the variation in the existing literature is not very high. With few exceptions
all studies have values of TEMPT lower than 0.5 and values of RISK higher than 0.3. We added our
own lab studies to increase the variation in our parameters of interest. To select payoff parameters
for our own studies we partitioned the RISK-TEMPT space ([0, 1]× [0, 1]) into squares of size (0.2)2 and
added our own studies s.t. there is at least one study in each element of the partition.6 Within these
constraints we then selected payoffs arbitrarily, preferring “easy numbers” (such as 200) to “difficult
numbers” (such as 197.38965). Last, we randomly allocated these games to the lab (repeated and
random rematching games) or AMT (one-shot). The parameter values used in our own studies are
summarized in Tables A1 and A2 in Online Appendix A and data sets permitting replication are
available online. Balancing tests, where we check whether the distributions of RISK and TEMPT are
5We do allow for studies in which beliefs were elicited and we allow for asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma games
as well. Robustness checks show that excluding those would not affect the overall results (see Table B11 in Online
Appendix B.2).
6We selected payoff parameters based on a slightly different definition of RISK and TEMPT used in an earlier
version. With few exceptions all studies fall in the same square (though not the exact same coordinates) as they did
previously.
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balanced across the repeated and random rematching games can be found in Table B1 in Online
Appendix B.1.
(a) Existing Literature (b) All Studies
Figure 1: Variation in RISK and TEMPT parameters in the existing literature and including our own
studies. Existing literature is marked by squares, own lab studies by triangles and own AMT studies
by circles. If several studies have the same parameters only one is shown.
1.2 Risk and Temptation Indices
We now proceed to describing our three key variables RISK, TEMPT and EFF. Consider a payoff matrix
Π as the one illustrated in Figure 2 (left panel). Two fundamental inequalities on the entries of Π
need to be satisfied in order for it to describe a Prisoner’s dilemma: (i) c > a, which we will refer
to as “temptation” and (ii) b < d, which we refer to as “risk”. Usually, we also require a > d, i.e.
that mutual cooperation is socially desirable and hence that there is a tension between efficiency and
individual rationality. If any of these were not satisfied we would not refer to the game defined by
Π as prisoner’s dilemma game. In particular, assume that a > d. Then, if c > a (temptation), but
b > d (no risk), Π describes an Anti-Coordination or Hawk Dove Game. If, by contrast, c < a (no
temptation) and b < d (risk), then the game is a Coordination game. If c < a and b > d (neither
temptation nor risk), then cooperation is a dominant strategy in the game. The relative amounts of
risk and temptation also determine whether the game is supermodular, i.e. of strategic complements
or substitutes. In particular, in order for the game to be supermodular c− a ≤ d− b is required, i.e.
temptation cannot exceed risk. Our interest in this study is how these two defining payoff differences
shape behaviour.
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Now in a meta-study we will compare many different studies conducted in different countries at
different times with different payoff scales and different exchange rates from experimental to local
currency. In other words, a participant facing payoff matrix Π will be paid according to αΠ where
α ∈ R+ reflects the exchange rate from experimental currency (tokens) into purchasing power in
the location and at the time when the experiment was conducted. The evidence on whether such
linear transformations of payoffs affect behaviour in experimental games is somewhat mixed and
depends on what type of linear transformation (changing stakes and/or frames) one has in mind.7
Because we do not want to impose invariance to linear transformations, we focus on a percentage
based definition rather than absolute differences in defining our indices of temptation and risk.8 We
define the percentage based measures TEMPT and RISK as follows.
C D
C a b
D c d
PD game.
C D
C 1 -RISKNorm
D 1 + TEMPTNorm 0
Normalized game.
Figure 2: Left: Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with payoff parameters c > a > d > b. The additional
condition c+ b < 2a ensures that joint cooperation is more efficient than alternating between (C,D)
and (D,C). Table B10 in Online Appendix B.2 splits the sample according to whether or not this
condition is satisfied. Right: Normalized game with a = 1 and d = 0 (hence EFF= 1) represented
using the normalization based indices RISKNorm and TEMPTNorm.
Temptation (TEMPT) We measure the extent of temptation the game presents by the percentage
gain when unilaterally defecting against a cooperator, more specifically by TEMPT= c−a
c
, which ranges
between 0 and 1 as long as c > a > 0, which is the case in all our studies. TEMPT=0 means there is
no temptation (a = c) and TEMPT=1 means maximal temptation, where a is negligible compared to
7When it comes to linear transformations which do affect stakes the direction of effects is typically unchanged, while
effect sizes can change (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Framing effects have been shown to affect behaviour despite
not affecting stakes (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Iturbe et al., 2011). Linear transformations which do
neither affect stakes nor involve substantial changes to the frame (other than payoffs being multiplied by a constant),
such as exchange rates (between experimental currency and “real” currency) are thought not to affect behaviour, but
to our knowledge this has never been directly tested.
8Note that cases where one of the entries in Π is zero (in our data those are always b = 0) are somewhat problematic,
since those cases may imply that percentage based measures do not change even under some non-linear transformations
such as e.g. (α1, α2)Π, α1 6= α2 ∈ R, where we would expect behaviour to change. This happens because 0 is invariant
to scaling. To deal with such cases we slightly perturb all zero entries in Π by adding a noise term drawn uniformly
from the open unit interval.
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c. In our data the variable TEMPT ranges between 0.03 and 0.83.
Risk (RISK) We measure the extent of risk the game presents by the percentage loss when unilat-
erally cooperating against a defector, i.e. by RISK= d−b
d
, which ranges between 0 and 1 as long as
d > b > 0 with the natural interpretation that RISK= 0 if b = d and RISK= 1 if b is “much smaller”
than d. In our data the variable RISK ranges between 0 and 1.
Efficiency (EFF) An important consideration for cooperation might also be efficiency, i.e. how
much can be gained by mutual cooperation as opposed to mutual defection. We measure the extent
of possible efficiency gains in the game by EFF= a−d
a
, which ranges between 0 and 1 if a > d > 0.
In our data the variable EFF ranges between 0 and 0.83.9 We are mostly focused on RISK and
TEMPT , because EFF involves payoff comparisons based on bilateral changes (and hence does not
affect standard incentives as long as c > a and d > b are satisfied). We use EFF as a control, however,
in almost all regressions.10
Normalization An alternative to percentage based measures is to normalize EFF= 1 by subtracting
d from all payoffs and dividing the resulting entries by (a−d). This yields the game shown in Figure
2 on the right hand side, where RISKNorm = d−b
a−d and TEMPT
Norm = c−a
a−d .
11 This normalization has
been frequently used in the literature (Stahl, 1991; Embrey et al., 2016). The downside of this
approach is that, as efficiency (a− d) is normalized to one, it is not possible to control explicitly for
efficiency differences across games and hence to net out the effect of risk and temptation. The fact
that both RISKNorm and TEMPTNorm are obtained after dividing by (a− d) under this approach also
induces collinearity between the risk and temptation measures, which is undesirable given our aim
to disentangle their role. This is why we prefer to use the percentage based measures defined above
for our main analysis. Still, we will show in Online Appendix B.2 that our main results (reported
in Section 3) are qualitatively robust when considering this approach as well as when considering an
approach based on absolute payoff differences.
9There are 6 studies in our sample, however, for which 0 ≥ d > b. For those studies we define RISK= |d−b||b| to ensure
that RISK ranges between 0 and 1. For 6 studies where a > 0 > d we define EFF= 1 to avoid non-monotonicity, as
EFF= 1 if d = 0. Dropping these studies does not affect our results qualitatively (Table B11 in Online Appendix B.2).
10Note that a game where RISK=TEMPT=EFF= 0 is a trivial game where all payoffs are equal.
11The pairwise correlation coefficient between RISK and RISKNorm is 0.4257∗∗∗ and between TEMPT and TEMPTNorm
it is 0.4876∗∗∗.
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Correlation and Balancing Tests Across all our studies the correlation between the three key
variables RISK , TEMPT and EFF tends to be not statistically significant. Between RISK and TEMPT the
Spearman correlation coefficient is−0.0217 (0.0749 if the AMT studies are excluded), neither of which
is statistically significant. Between RISK and EFF the coefficient is −0.0162 (−0.0143), again both
insignificant. Between TEMPT and EFF the correlation coefficients are −0.0631 (−0.0833), both
statistically insignificant. Balancing tests, where we regress RISK and TEMPT on a partner dummy
are reported in Table B1 in Online Appendix B.1. They show that the whole sample as well as the
sub-samples obtained by splitting according to the median RISK and TEMPT are balanced.12
1.3 Theoretical Background
In this section we try to develop some intuition for how RISK and TEMPT could affect behaviour
in one-shot and repeated games. The purpose of the paper is not to test for specific theories. Still,
we find it useful to give some idea of how and when we would expect RISK and TEMPT to affect
incentives.
Stranger/one-shot settings Incentives in the one-shot game are governed by the expected payoff
difference between cooperating and defecting which we denote ∆piei . We further denote by p the
probability with which a player believes that her opponent cooperates.
The relative importance of RISK and TEMPT for short run incentives ∆piei depends on p in a
straightforward manner. If people are pessimistic, i.e. p = 0, then short run incentives will be
governed by RISK.13 If, by contrast, players in such situations are optimistic, i.e. assume that p = 1,
then short run incentives will be governed by TEMPT. If, on the other hand, players follow Laplace’s
principle of insufficient reason and attach probability p = 1
2
to their opponent being cooperative,
then both RISK and TEMPT should matter equally.
12One advantage of adding our own studies to the existing literature is that it does give us some control over
collinearity of RISK and TEMPT and allows us to ensure that the distribution of our indices is balanced across the
different scenarios (repeated, one-shot, stranger matching) that we are interested in
13Note that the stranger and one-shot settings aim to capture interactions where people have no prior experience
nor knowledge about their opponent’s type. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maintain that people would resort to
pessimistic priors in situations characterized by Knightian uncertainty. To the extent that this is a good model to
think about beliefs in the one-shot/stranger setting, this theory would give some role to RISK. Risk is also crucial in
determining short run incentives in Blonski et al. (2011), as reflected by their Axiom 3.
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Partner setting In the repeated game the role of RISK and TEMPT is not as straightforward. In
these games people have a larger strategy set available. In the literature usually some assumptions
on strategy sets or cooperative types are made to derive predictions that can be contrasted with
experimental data. Embrey et al. (2016), for example, assume that players in the finitely repeated
game decide only between GT and the strategy “allD”, where GT denotes grim-trigger, i.e. the
strategy that starts out by cooperating and switches to defecting until the end of the game as soon
as the opponent defects once (see also Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011)). We denote this strategy set
by S1 = {GT, allD}. Since we are interested in finitely repeated games, we can also consider a
larger strategy set S2 = {GT, 1GT, 2GT, 3GT, ..., allD}, where 1GT denotes the best response to
grim trigger in the finitely repeated game, which is to cooperate in all rounds except for the last one.
2GT denotes the best response to 1GT (cooperate in all rounds but the last two) etc. and “allD”
denotes the strategy that chooses always defection.14
Based on S1, Embrey et al. (2016) derive an index that captures the probability that a player
must assign to the other player playing GT so that they are indifferent between GT and “allD”
themselves (see also Blonski et al. (2011) and Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011)). Following Embrey et al.
(2016) we can normalize EFF by setting a = 1 and d = 0 (hence EFF = 1). The normalized game is
illustrated on the right of Figure 2. In the normalized game this index can be expressed as follows:
RISKNorm
(T−1)+RISKNorm−TEMPTNorm . Hence this index includes aspects of both RISK and TEMPT (as well as the
normalized EFF) . It takes the value zero if RISKNorm = 0. Since the “allD” and GT strategies can
potentially differ in all periods, the index depends also on the time horizon T . If T = 1, the value
of the index exceeds 1 reflecting the fact that cooperation cannot be sustained in the one-shot game
under these assumptions. We will include this index in our regressions in Section 3 to see how it
compares to RISK, TEMPT and other measures from the literature.
Based on S2, the probability that a standard type must assign to the other player playing GT
so that they choose 1GT rather than any less cooperative strategy is c−a
c−d . In the normalized game
this probability can be expressed as TEMPT
Norm
1+TEMPTNorm
. If TEMPTNorm = 0, then this threshold is zero, i.e.
a cooperative equilibrium always exists. ((C,C) is a Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game in this
14One advantage of using the smaller strategy set S1 is that the resulting index can also be applied in indefinitely
repeated games (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2011). Note that the intermediate strategies 1GT, ..., (T − 1)GT in strategy
set S2 are not well defined in indefinitely repeated games.
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case.) This threshold does not depend on the time horizon T , since 1GT and the optimal deviation
strategy 2GT differ by just one period. Under these assumptions, RISK should not play much of a
role in explaining participant’s incentives to cooperate in the finitely repeated game.
2 Results: Average Cooperation Rates
Our first set of results presented in this section uses information from all the 96 studies contained in
our data set. Those are all the studies listed in Tables A1-A3 in Online Appendix A, in all of which
an average cooperation rate is available that we will use as endogenous variable in this Section. For
the one-shot and Stranger settings (T = 1) we use the average cooperation rate across all matches.
For the repeated game setting (T > 1) we use the average cooperation rate in the last match in our
baseline specification.15 The average cooperation rate thus computed ranges between 0.04 and 0.84
in the one-shot and Stranger treatments with a mean of 0.37. In the repeated game it ranges between
0.17 and 0.58 with a mean of 0.39. The main reason to consider these matches is that this is the data
available in all 96 studies. Hence this choice maximizes our sample size. To understand to which
extent results depend on this choice, we will also consider specifications, though, that consider only
the first stage game both in the T = 1 and T > 1 cases as well as specifications where we consider
all matches and stages both in the T = 1 and T > 1 cases. In Section 5 we also use other measures
than just these average cooperation rate relying on the smaller sample of studies for which the data
available allow us to do so.
We start by asking how much of the variation in average cooperation rates across studies can
be explained by RISK or TEMPT. Table 1 shows the results of simple OLS regressions explaining the
average cooperation rates with our variables of interest: RISK, TEMPT and EFF.
One Shot Games (Stranger) Columns (1)-(4) focus on the Stranger setting that is meant to
capture interactions where people have no prior experience with their opponent. Column (1) focuses
on one shot games (T = M = 1), where experimental participants played the prisoner’s dilemma for
one period only. Column (2) focuses on games with more than one period in the Stranger setting
1516 out of the 23 repeated game studies in our sample do only have one match, in which case “all matches” is the
same as “the last match”.
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(T = 1;M > 1) and column (3) pools these cases, i.e. contains all 73 studies conducted within
the Stranger paradigm (T = 1). Column (4) focuses on the average cooperation rate in the first
match, i.e. the first one-shot game played. All regressions consistently show a substantial negative
effect of RISK on average cooperation rates. The coefficient on RISK ranges between -0.290*** and
-0.197*** and is remarkably consistent across the 1-match and multi-match studies. The variable
TEMPT , by contrast, does not have any statistically significant impact on cooperation rates in these
studies and the coefficient size is smaller ranging between -0.110 and 0.002. Efficiency seems to have
a substantial and positive impact on cooperation rates, which is not statistically significant in the
multi-match games, though (column (2)). Figure 3(a) illustrates data points as well as a simple OLS
regression of average cooperation rates on either RISK or TEMPT.
Stranger (T = 1) Partner (T > 1)
1 match > 1 matches Pooled Pooled Repeated Repeated
1st stage & match 1st stage & match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RISK -0.269*** -0.197** -0.255*** -0.290*** 0.008 -0.263
(0.066) (0.096) (0.060) (0.057) (0.111) (0.177)
TEMPT -0.055 -0.110 0.002 -0.046 -0.208 -0.263*
(0.096) (0.118) (0.079) (0.073) (0.107) (0.134)
EFF 0.308*** 0.192 0.291*** 0.303*** 0.320** -0.012
(0.100) (0.133) (0.089) (0.086) (0.114) (0.348)
Constant 0.455*** 0.332*** 0.370*** 0.451*** 0.189 0.692**
(0.098) (0.118) (0.083) (0.078) (0.141) (0.289)
Observations 45 28 73 69 23 14
Sample Lab/AMT Lab Lab/AMT Lab/AMT Lab Lab
R-squared 0.484 0.333 0.377 0.458 0.353 0.478
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Average cooperation rate regressed on variables of interest.
Repeated Game Columns (5)-(6) in Table 1 show the results for the repeated game (partner)
setting. Column (5) focuses on the average cooperation rate across all stages in the last match and
Column (6) on the first stage of the first match. This regression has less power than the “Stranger”
regressions, since the number of repeated game studies in our data set is smaller and since first-stage
cooperation rates are not available in all studies. The variable RISK is not statistically significant
and the coefficient size smaller than in the corresponding Stranger settings. TEMPT, by contrast,
seems to affect cooperation rates in this setting. The variable TEMPT has a substantial coefficient
size (−0.208 or −0.263∗, respectively) and is statistically significant at the 10% level if only the first
game is considered. Figure 3(b) shows data points as well as a simple OLS regression of average
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(a) Stranger (b) Partner
Figure 3: Average cooperation rate for different levels of RISK and TEMPT. Lines show fitted values
from OLS regressions of average cooperation rate on either RISK (coefficients: -0.319*** in Stranger
and -0.093 in Partner) or TEMPT (dashed lines; coefficients: -0.017 in Stranger and -0.128 in Partner),
respectively
cooperation rates on either RISK or TEMPT (without controlling for EFF).
Robustness tests In Online Appendix B.2 we report a number of robustness checks. First, we
show that, by and large, qualitatively the same results are obtained when an absolute rather than our
percentage-based measure is used (Tables B2-B4.) Second, we show that results are robust when we
normalize EFF= 1 and then use the normalization based measure as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure
2 (Tables B5-B7). We then report another set of robustness checks. We show that the results shown
in Table 1 are robust when we use weighted regressions, where we weigh our studies by the number of
independent observations (Table B8). Results are also robust to dropping some studies with “special”
details, such as studies were beliefs were elicited or studies that were paper-based (Table B9) and
the main effects appear both in games where mutual cooperation is efficient (2a > c + b) and cases
where alternating between outcomes (C,D) and (D,C) is efficient (Table B10). Table B12 includes
interactions of our main variables of interest with a dummy variable “new” which indicates whether
a study was conducted by us. This table shows that results are very similar across the set of existing
studies and our new studies. Finally, Table B13 reproduces Table 2 below but focuses on average
cooperation rates across all matches and stages for both settings. Results are qualitatively the same.
Partner vs Stranger In Table 2 we ask whether average cooperation rates are higher in “partner”
(T > 1) or “stranger” (T = 1) settings. Existing research has delivered mixed results on this
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partner -0.143 0.149** -0.060 -0.007 -0.014
(0.098) (0.069) (0.096) (0.080) (0.045)
Constant 0.372*** 0.296*** 0.451*** 0.307*** 0.359***
(0.048) (0.040) (0.045) (0.035) (0.022)
Observations 25 24 23 26 96
RISK Small High Small High All
TEMPT Small Small High High All
R-squared 0.084 0.174 0.018 0.000 0.001
1st stage game only
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
Partner -0.016 0.101* -0.059 -0.077 -0.012
(0.105) (0.061) (0.130) (0.084) (0.053)
Constant 0.436*** 0.318*** 0.476*** 0.350*** 0.399***
(0.052) (0.043) (0.041) (0.034) (0.022)
Observations 24 18 20 24 84
RISK Small High Small High All
TEMPT Small Small High High All
R-squared 0.001 0.071 0.012 0.037 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Partner vs Stranger. Average cooperation rates regressed on “Partner” dummy. Sample
partitioned into four sub-samples according to median RISK and TEMPT. Column (5) shows entire
sample.
question. Some authors have found that there is more cooperation in partner settings (Andreoni
and Miller, 1993; Cooper et al., 1996), while others have found no difference (Boone et al., 1999) or
more cooperation in Stranger settings (Andreoni, 1988). Dal Bo (2005) find more cooperation in the
“partner” condition with a long horizon in the repeated game and no difference with a short horizon
of the repeated game. Note also that, while Dal Bo (2005) compare matches of different lengths
(T = 1 in the one shot case and T ∈ {2, 4} in the “partner” case), the earlier literature has typically
compared games with the same number of periods, where a period is a new match in the “stranger”
case and a new stage within the same match in the “partner” case.
In Table 2 we regress average cooperation rates on a dummy indicating whether the study is a
“partner” (T > 1) study. In the top panel of Table 2, the average cooperation rate is based on all
matches in the “stranger setting” and on the last match in the “partner setting”. In the bottom
panel the average cooperation rate is the cooperation rate in the first (stage) game played in the first
match. We partition our sample into four sub-samples according to the median RISK and median
TEMPT. Columns (1) and (1b) show studies with below median RISK and below median TEMPT ,
columns (2) and (2b) with above median RISK and below median TEMPT , columns (3) and (3b)
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with below median RISK and above median TEMPT and in columns (4) and (4b) both RISK and
TEMPT are above the median. Columns (5) and (5b) shows the entire sample. Balancing tests, which
show that the distributions of RISK and TEMPT are balanced across these sub-samples can be found
in Table B1 in Online Appendix B.1.
Table 2 shows that there are no statistically significant differences between partner and stranger
settings in the entire sample and in none of the sub-samples except for the case where RISK is high
and TEMPT is small (columns (2) and (2b)). In these cases the partner setting is able to generate
cooperation rates which are ≈ 15 percentage points higher than the stranger setting. What is also
noticeable is that, while the partner dummy alone can explain around 18 percent of the variation if
RISK is high and TEMPT low (7 percent for the first game), in all other cases the R2 is lower and
in Column (5) where all studies are aggregated it is very close to zero. This analysis shows that the
effect of the matching technology (partner vs stranger) is mediated by the RISK and TEMPT indices.
While for some values of RISK and TEMPT the partner matching can lead to substantially higher
cooperation rates, this is not generally the case. It is interesting to compare these results to the
public good game. In a meta-study for the public good game Zelmer (2003) has found that there
are on average higher contributions in the partner compared to the stranger setting. There are a
number of possible explanations for this difference. In the linear public good game studied by Zelmer
(2003) it is not possible to create the same variation in RISK and TEMPT as both variables co-move
with the same parameter, the marginal per capita rate of return. Hence it is possible that the RISK-
TEMPT ratio in the public goods literature is simply favorable to higher contributions in the partner
setting. It could also be that the larger group sizes in the public good game are a factor in this
comparison.
Number of Stages/Matches In our analysis so far we have bundled together studies with a
different number of matches and different lengths of the repeated game (number of stages). There are
multiple ways, however, in which the number of stages and matches could affect average cooperation
rates as well as the impact of RISK and TEMPT.
In the one-shot game the number of matches played in the past (m) can affect a participants’
experience with the setting and hence possibly their behaviour. For the one-shot/stranger setting we
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One-Shot/Stranger Repeated Game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RISK -0.255*** -0.266*** -0.260*** 0.008 0.007 -0.008 -0.015 0.164 0.003
(0.060) (0.053) (0.071) (0.111) (0.103) (0.123) (0.127) (0.655) (0.116)
TEMPT 0.002 -0.092 0.116 -0.104 -0.299*** -0.087 -0.299** 0.057 -0.037
(0.079) (0.070) (0.086) (0.107) (0.094) (0.117) (0.098) (0.234) (0.326)
EFF 0.291*** 0.346*** 0.370*** 0.320** -0.004 0.313** -0.047 0.442 0.462***
(0.089) (0.081) (0.105) (0.114) (0.164) (0.123) (0.211) (0.447) (0.151)
Matches/Stages 0.012 0.045 0.081
(0.021) (0.038) (0.455)
RISK× Matches/Stages -0.004 -0.018 -0.213
(0.013) (0.039) (0.125)
TEMPT× Matches/Stages -0.038*** -0.016 -0.022
(0.010) (0.027) (0.512)
EFF× Matches/Stages -0.015 -0.022 -0.081
(0.020) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant 0.370*** 0.451*** 0.322*** 0.189 0.496** 0.191 0.521** -0.159 0.066
(0.083) (0.077) (0.102) (0.141) (0.166) (0.151) (0.187) (0.748) (0.213)
Observations 73 73 73 23 23 23 23 23 23
NStages Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES NO YES NO NO
NMatches Fixed Effects NO YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Match/Stage Interactions NO NO Match NO NO NO NO Stage Match
R-squared 0.377 0.607 0.513 0.353 0.822 0.363 0.824 0.516 0.467
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Average cooperation rate regressed on variables of interest with number of stages/matches
fixed effects and interactions.
would hence like to control for the average number of past matches played, i.e.
∑M
m=1(m−1)
M
= M−1
2
.
Remember that, since in this Section our unit of observation is a study S, we cannot exploit variation
in m within a study. We will do so, however, in Section 4.
In the repeated game setting the number of past matches played can also affect participants’
experience. In addition, the number of stages T can play an important role in this setting. First,
a longer time horizon (more stages) could lead to more cooperation, because agents have more to
gain by establishing a reputation as cooperative types (Kreps et al., 1982; Mengel, 2014). A longer
time horizon also decreases the Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011) and Embrey et al. (2016) threshold
for cooperation discussed above. In fact, Embrey et al. (2016) find that, contrary to the backward
induction prediction, T affects cooperation. In line with the unraveling logic of backward induction,
Embrey et al. (2016) also find that participants cooperate on average more the higher the number of
stages T and the first defection round moves earlier the more matches they have experienced in the
past. For the repeated game we will hence want to additionally control for the number of stages.
The number of matches in our sample ranges between 1 and 100 in the Stranger condition and
between 1 and 10 in the repeated game. The number of stages is, by definition, always 1 in the
Stranger setting and ranges between 2 and 25 in the Partner setting. Table 3 controls for the number
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of stages/matches in a variety of ways.
Columns (1)-(3) focus on the Stranger setting, where the number of stages is always one. Column
(1) corresponds to our basic estimates from Table 1, Column (2) includes fixed effects for the number
of matches (M) and Column (3) controls linearly for the number of matches and includes interaction
terms.16 The coefficient on RISK is very stable across these three specifications (between −0.255∗∗∗
and −0.266∗∗∗). There is no statistically significant effect of the number of matches played on average
cooperation rates. Note, though, that the R2 is substantially higher if the number of matches is
controlled for.
Columns (4)-(9) focus on the Partner setting. Column (4) corresponds to our estimation from
Table 1 which does not control for the number of stages (T ) or past matches (M − 1). Columns
(5)-(7) include either T - or M - fixed effects or both. The coefficient on TEMPT is substantially higher
(and statistically significant) once T-fixed effects (for the number of stages) are included. Also the
R2 is substantially higher in this case. Closer inspection of the fixed effects reveals that cooperation
rates are lower in shorter games (with fewer stages). This is consistent with our intuition: longer
games make it easier to establish cooperation in early rounds, because participants can gain more
by establishing a reputation as cooperative types. Including M-fixed effects, by contrast, does not
change the coefficient on TEMPT much, nor does it increase the R2 substantially. Note that this
analysis merely asks how the number of stages or matches affects average cooperation rates. The
dynamics of cooperation within matches will be analyzed in Section 4.
Result 1 • Variation in average cooperation rates in one-shot games is best explained by RISK ,
while TEMPT best explains variation in cooperation rates in repeated games.
• There is more cooperation in the repeated (partner) compared to the one-shot (stranger)
game if and only if RISK is high and TEMPT is low.
3 Results: Other Indices
In this section we compare our measures RISK and TEMPT to a number of other indices based on payoff
parameters that have been used in the literature, notably by Murnighan and Roth (1983). Most of
16Note that M is perfectly collinear to M−12 . Controlling for the latter (or more precisely the smallest integer bigger
than M−12 ) yields identical results in terms of the impact of RISK, TEMPT and EFF.
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this literature has been motivated by creating an index of all payoff parameters that “summarizes”
incentives in the Prisoner’s dilemma. Hence typically these indices contain aspects of all three:
RISK,TEMPT and EFF, but with different emphasis.
Murnighan and Roth (1983) discuss 10 different indices used previously in the literature.17 Indices
R1 = a−d
c−b , R2 =
a−b
c−b , R3 =
d−b
c−b and R4 =
c−a
c−b measure efficiency (R1), value of mutual cooperation
compared to unilateral cooperation (R2), risk (R3) and temptation (R4) all relative to the difference
between the “temptation” (c) and “sucker” (b) payoffs. Indices E1 = c−a
a−d and E2 =
c−a
a−b both
measure temptation relative to efficiency (E1) or relative to the difference between the value of
mutual cooperation compared to unilateral cooperation (E2).18 Finally, indices K1 = a+ b− c− d,
K2 = a − b + c − d, K3 = a − b − c + d and K4 = a + b + c + d measure the “control one has
ove one’s own outcomes” (K1), the “fate control” one player has over another (K2), the “behavioral
control” of one over the other (K3) and the “overall level of outcomes in the game” (K4). The labels
and interpretation are adopted from Murnighan and Roth (1983) and will be preceded by MR- in
the following. We also compare to the index used by Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011) and Embrey et al.
(2016) discussed in Section 1.3, which is referred to as BAD for “Basin of attraction of defection”.19
While our measures RISK, TEMPT and EFF all range in [0, 1] this is not generally the case for the
indices discussed above. To be able to compare coefficient sizes we hence standardize all variables to
mean zero and standard deviation one in this Section.
We first ask how our results from Section 2 change if these other indices are considered. We
start with the one-shot/Stranger condition, where we have found above that the variable RISK can
explain variation in cooperation rates well. Table B14 in Online Appendix B.3 shows the results
of regressions, where in column (1) we regress average cooperation rates on our variables RISK ,
TEMPT and EFF (as in column (3) of Table 1) just that now we use standardized values of RISK ,
TEMPT and EFF. The results show that a standard deviation increase in RISK leads to an ≈ 8%
decrease in cooperation rates. The TEMPT coefficient is near zero (and statistically insignificant).
Across columns (2)-(12) we add one each of the eleven indices described above.20 RISK is statistically
17Their eleventh index involves the discount rate in indefinitely repeated games and is hence not applicable.
18Index E1 corresponds to TEMPTNorm defined on the normalized game in Figure 2. It is also the inverse of the
“benefit to cost ratio” employed by Capraro et al. (2014).
19As all indices used in the regressions, the BAD index used here is defined on the not normalized game, i.e. the
left game in Figure 1. The index defined on the not normalized game is BAD = −b+d(a−d)∗T−b−c+2d .
20Adding all of them simultaneously would lead to considerable over-fitting in our sample of 73 observations as
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significant in all columns (1)-(12) and the coefficient size is substantial ranging between −0.099∗∗∗
to −0.046∗∗∗ (compared to −0.081∗∗∗ in column (1)). None of the additional indices included are
statistically significant with the exception of MR-R3 (column (4)) which is interpreted by Murnighan
Roth as a measure of risk and in fact shares the same numerator as our measure RISK. It is also
interesting to note that in none of the regressions (1)-(12), the variable TEMPT plays a significant
role.
Table B15 in Online Appendix B.3 shows the results for the repeated game. What emerges clearly
is that, unlike in the Stranger condition, RISK here does not affect cooperation rates significantly.
The RISK coefficient is 0.002 in the basic regression in column (1) and never statistically significant
across columns (2)-(12) ranging in size between −0.014 to 0.037. Results are a bit less clear-cut
when it comes to what does affect cooperation rates. TEMPT has a negative impact on cooperation
rates in columns (4) and (12). EFF has a positive impact in most specifications and in particular
BAD seems important, where a one SD increase leads to an ≈ 13% increase in cooperation rates.
Including the BAD index also substantially increases the R2 compared to all other regressions, which
is not too surprising as it is the only index that accounts for the number of stages T . None of the
Murnigan-Roth measures has a statistically significant effect.
Comparing indices via R2 We also conduct two “horseraces” between the 14 indices. In the first
we simply run the following OLS regression yi = α+βxi+i, where yi is the average cooperation rate
in study i (defined as in Section 3) and xi ∈ {RISK, TEMPT, EFF,MRR1, ...,MRK3,MRK4, BAD}.
We then ask which index x produces the highest R2, i.e. explains most of the variation in average
cooperation rates. To obtain confidence intervals we bootstrap the R2 using 3000 replications. Table
4 shows the results of this exercise. In the Stranger (T = 1) setting (leftmost column) RISK has the
highest R2 among all indices explaining around 28% of the observed variation in cooperation rates.
MRR3 and EFF (whose R2 are statistically not different from that of RISK) and to a lesser extent
BAD and MRR1 can also explain a good part of the variation.21 The R2 of all other indices is not
well as possible collinearity. Tables B16 and B17 in Online Appendix B.3 show separate regressions for one-shot
(T = M = 1) and multi-match (T = 1;M > 1) studies with qualitatively the same results.
21Note that BAD was designed with the repeated game in mind and assumes values above one if T = 1. It is
hence harder to interpret in the one-shot game, but can nevertheless explain around 15% of the observed variation in
cooperation rates.
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Comparison of Indices I
Stranger Partner Partner
Nstages fe
1 RISK (0.280∗∗∗) BAD (0.247∗) TEMPT (0.822)
[0.093,0.467] [0.031, 0.526] [0.719, 0.925]
2 MRR3 (0.267∗∗∗) MRR1 (0.234∗∗) MRR2 (0.821∗∗∗)
[0.089,0.445] [0.035, 0.434] [0.729, 0.913]
3 EFF (0.213∗∗) MRR2 (0.178) MRR4 (0.821∗∗∗)
[0.036, 0.371] [0, 0.401] [0.733, 0.908]
4 BAD (0.170∗∗) MRR4 (0.178) BAD (0.817∗∗∗)
[0.015, 0.325] [0, 0.400] [0.655, 0.840]
5 MRR1 (0.141∗) EFF (0.146∗) MRE1 (0.816∗∗∗)
[0.001, 0.277] [0.004, 0.321] [0.702, 0.930]
6 MRK3 (0.012) MRK3 (0.139) MRR1 (0.792∗∗∗)
[0,0.066] [0, 0.344] [0.689, 0.895]
7 MRE1 (0.010) MRK2 (0.139) MRE2 (0.780∗∗∗)
[0, 0.039] [0, 0.377] [0.652, 0.904]
8 MRK1 (0.007) MRE2 (0.109) MRK3 (0.778∗∗∗)
[0, 0.054] [0, 0.244] [0.652, 0.904]
9 MRE2 (0.003) MRK4 (0.069) MRK1 (0.705∗∗∗)
[0, 0.041] [0, 0.236] [0.521, 0.889]
10 MRK2 (0.001) MRE1 (0.051) EFF(0.670∗∗∗)
[0, 0.041] [0, 0.208] [0.492, 0.804]
11 TEMPT (0.000) TEMPT (0.049) MRR3 (0.670∗∗∗)
[0, 0.031] [0,0.233] [0.532, 0.812]
12 MRR2 (0.000) RISK (0.028) MRK4 (0.666∗∗∗)
[0, 0.030] [0, 0.175] [0.491, 0.862]
13 MRR4 (0.000) MRR3 (0.018) MRK2 (0.658∗∗∗)
[0, 0.029] [0, 0.150] [0.468, 0.808]
14 MRK4 (0.000) MRK1 (0.009) RISK (0.647∗∗∗)
[0, 0.020] [0, 0.128] [0.449, 0.804]
Table 4: Indices ranked by mean R2 in simple OLS regression yi = α + βxi + i. Bootstrapped R
2
(3000 replications). Mean R2 in brackets. Stars indicate whether R2 is significantly different from zero
(∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1). 95% confidence interval for R2 (based on empirical distribution) in
square brackets. With number of stages fixed effects not all bootstrap replicates allowed to estimate
all coefficients. R2 estimates are based on remaining replications.
statistically different from zero.
In the repeated game (middle column) the BAD index has the highest R2 explaining just short
of 25% of the observed variation in average cooperation rates. The only other index with an R2
statistically different from zero in this smaller sample is MRR1. TEMPT , by contrast, is not able to
explain much of the variation in cooperation rates by itself. This changes as we include number of
stages fixed effects in the regression (rightmost column). As already seen in Table 3 this substantially
increases the explanatory power of TEMPT. In fact TEMPT now even has the highest R2, even though
the distributions of R2 across the 3000 replications of the bootstrap are not significantly different for
the first nine indices in Table 4. Since the number of stages is key to explaining average cooperation
rates in the repeated game, the R2 is substantially higher once number of stages fixed effects are
included and, in fact, now all regressions have an R2 clearly above zero.
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In a second type of horse-race we allow for more than one index in the regression to account for
the fact that certain “families of indices” might explain behaviour well. We hence run the following
regressions
yi = α + β1xi + β2x
′
i + β3x
′′
i + i, (1)
where for each fixed index x we add two more indices x′, x′′ 6= x to the regression from the set
{RISK, TEMPT, EFF,MRR1, ...,MRK3,MRK4, BAD}. This method yields a total of 169 regressions
for each index x, some involving two (if x′ = x′′) and some involving three (if x′ 6= x′′) different
indices.
(a) Stranger (b) Partner
Figure 4: Cumulative Density function of bootstrapped R2 (100 reps) for 14 indices across all regres-
sions based on equation (2) which involve the index in question. Bold solid line indicates RISK and
bold dashed line indicates TEMPT.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of R2 across these 169 regressions for each of the 14 indices.
RISK is highlighted in bold and TEMPT by a bold dashed line. In the Stranger setting (shown in
Panel (a)), the R2 distribution of RISK first order stochastically dominates all other indices, except
for two (MRR3 and EFF). RISK has the highest minimal R2 and the highest R2 overall. TEMPT , by
contrast is among the worst performing indices in the one-shot (stranger) setting.
Results are different in the repeated game. RISK is now among the worst performing indices
and TEMPT does relatively better compared to the one-index regressions when combined with other
indices. Despite no stage-fixed effects being included in this analysis, there is only one index (MRR4)
that first-order stochastically dominates TEMPT. Other indices that do well are BAD and MRR2.
The best family of indices in the Stranger combines RISK , MRR1 (a measure of efficiency)
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and MRR3 (a measure of risk). Hence aspects of risk and efficiency are important, but not so
much temptation. In the repeated game the best family includes BAD (which combines aspects
of RISK ,TEMPT and accounts for the number of stages T), MRR4 (a measure of temptation) and
MRK3, referred to by Murnighan and Roth (1983) as the “behavioural control” of one player over
the other.
In the case of Stranger, the best regression has an R2 of 0.3775 and in the case of the repeated
game of 0.6587. Hence, while combining indices has a relatively small effect in Stranger (34% increase
in R2 compared to the regression with only RISK), it does increase the R2 substantially in the repeated
game (by 266% compared to the best one-index regression with only BAD).
To sum up, we have seen that RISK explains variation in cooperation rates in the one-shot game
remarkably well also when compared to other indices. In the partner setting, several indices as well
as the length of the game (T ) are important in explaining variation in cooperation rates. Hence
disentangling the role of RISK and TEMPT proves successful in the one-shot games highlighting
RISK as a key influence on cooperation rates. This is in line with the idea of people using “pessimistic”
beliefs in the face of large uncertainty (see Section 2.3). In the repeated game, by contrast, several
indices matter. The analysis has highlighted, though, that TEMPT seems somewhat more important
in these games than RISK. Also BAD seems particularly important in these games in line with the
analysis presented in Section 2.3.
Result 2 RISK explains variation in average cooperation rates in the Stranger setting irrespective
of which of ten measures from the literature are included. In repeated settings RISK does not
explain variation in cooperation rates, but TEMPT as well as several indices from the literature
do.
4 Results: Dynamics
We next ask whether RISK and TEMPT differentially affect the dynamics of cooperation. To answer
this question we rely on data from all the studies on the 10-period prisoner’s dilemma, either repeated
(T = 10) or with random rematching (T = 1;M = 10) for which full data sets could be obtained.
Focusing on 10 period games maximizes the number of available data. The included studies are
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
all our own lab studies (see Table A1) as well as the studies by Andreoni and Miller (1993), by
Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006), by Cooper et al. (1996), by Dal Bo et al. (2010) and by Normann
and Wallace (2012). The resulting data set contains 7860 observations of 786 participants who
participated in 23 different studies or treatments. Studying this subsample allows us to understand
the effect of RISK and TEMPT on the dynamics of cooperation. It also allows us to exploit variation
in the number of past matches m or the number of past stages t within studies.
One-Shot games Repeated Games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RISK -0.239*** -0.208*** -0.018 -0.160* RISK -0.144
(0.049) (0.065) (0.061) (0.091) (0.077)
TEMPT -0.048 -0.105 -0.318*** -0.280*** TEMPT -0.294***
(0.036) (0.148) (0.072) (0.098) (0.091)
EFF 0.033 0.071 0.253** 0.118 EFF 0.294*
(0.076) (0.101) (0.120) (0.318) (0.152)
m -0.023** -0.049*** t -0.030**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014)
m× RISK 0.007 0.030*** t× RISK 0.022***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
m× TEMPT 0.012 -0.001 t× TEMPT -0.004
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
m× EFF -0.008 0.021 t× EFF -0.007
(0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Constant 0.374*** 0.481*** 0.358*** 0.589*** Constant 0.523***
(0.048) (0.064) (0.103) (0.243) (0.131)
Observations 5,180 5,180 2,680 2,680 Observations 2,680
Clusters 12 12 12 12 Clusters 11
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Cooperation regressed on variables of interest as well as number of past matches experienced
m and interactions. Column (5) includes past stages t and interactions. Random effects panel
regression with standard errors clustered at the study level.
Table 5 shows regression results. Columns (1)-(2) focus on the stranger setting and columns
(3)-(5) on the repeated game. Column (1) replicates our main result for this subsample of studies.
RISK is detrimental to cooperation in one-shot studies. Now neither TEMPT nor EFF do have
a statistically significant impact on cooperation. Column (2) shows that the number of matches
played m has a negative impact on cooperation. As participants gain experience, they cooperate
less. This is a typical pattern observed in prisoner’s dilemma studies with random rematching
(Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Bohnet and Kuebler, 2005; Dal Bo, 2005; Grimm and Mengel, 2009).
Experience m does, however, not interact with any of our indices in a statistically significant manner.
In the repeated game TEMPT has the most negative effect impact in this sample. Both experience
m and the number of past stages played t have a negative impact on cooperation rates. This is also
a typical finding: cooperation decreases over time both within matches and across matches. Now
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there is also an interesting interaction of m and t, respectively, with RISK. In line with Dal Bo´ and
Fre´chette (2011)’s basin of attraction effect, the detrimental effect of RISK is stronger in early stages
of the repeated game. In terms of the relative importance of RISK and TEMPT columns (4) and (6)
show that in early stages of a game and when players are inexperienced, RISK is comparatively more
important, while in later stages of the game and when players are more experienced TEMPT becomes
more important.
Partner vs Stranger As previous research has shown that dynamic considerations can also affect
the partner-stranger comparison (Mengel and Peeters, 2011), we briefly revisit this comparison.
Figure B3 in Online Appendix B4 shows the dynamics overall (main graph) and in four cases of
interest: (i) below median RISK and TEMPT (subgraph (a)), (ii) below median RISK and above
median TEMPT (b), (iii) above median RISK and below median TEMPT (c) and (iv) above median
RISK and TEMPT (d). While overall there is more cooperation in Partner compared to Stranger
in this subsample, this is not the case for all combinations of RISK and TEMPT. In particular, if
TEMPT is high (subgraphs (b) and (d)), there seems to be no difference in cooperation rates between
the partner and stranger settings.
These findings reinforce our finding obtained in Section 3. Because of the differential impact
of RISK and TEMPT on the one-shot and repeated game, respectively, comparisons of cooperation
rates across these settings will depend on the values of RISK and TEMPT. “High” RISK and “low”
TEMPT will be conducive to there being more cooperation in the repeated game, while in other
situations no difference or even the reverse ranking could be observed.
Result 3 The number of past matches and stages played has a negative impact on cooperation.
Furthermore, in the repeated game RISK is comparatively more important in early stages of a
game and when players are inexperienced, while in later stages of the game and when players
are more experienced TEMPT becomes more important
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5 Results: Questionnaire Data
This last section focuses on gender differences. There is a substantial literature on gender differences
in cooperation behaviour, which has remained inconclusive so far. Gender effects in the prisoner’s
dilemma have been studied by psychologists and some economists with about equally many studies
showing that men cooperate more, women cooperate more or that there is no statistically significant
difference (see the literature surveyed in Croson and Gneezy (2009)). We test for gender differences
in average individual cooperation rates. This last section exploits data from our own lab studies
listed in Table A1 in the Online Appendix with 363 participants.22
One-shot Repeated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female 0.215*** 0.014 0.291*** 0.032
(0.045) (0.031) (0.083) (0.053)
female × RISK -0.238*** -0.293**
(0.071) (0.127)
female × TEMPT -0.094 -0.207*
(0.075) (0.110)
Constant 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.302*** 0.302***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.038) (0.040)
Observations 238 238 125 125
R-squared 0.128 0.001 0.113 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Average individual cooperation rate regressed on gender dummy interacted with RISK and
TEMPT . Simple OLS regressions.
Table 6 regresses the average individual cooperation rate (across the ten periods played) on a
gender dummy interacted with RISK and TEMPT. Columns (1)-(2) show stranger treatments and
columns (3)-(4) partner treatments. Columns (1) and (3) include interactions and columns (2)
and (4) don’t. The table shows that on average across our games there is no gender difference
in cooperation rates (columns (2) and (4)). Women cooperate on average 23% of the time in the
stranger setting (33% in the repeated game) and men 22% of the time in the stranger setting and
30% in the repeated game. Neither of these differences is statistically significant.
Women are, however, more cooperative than the average man if RISK is low and less cooperative
if RISK is high (above 0.7 approximately in the stranger and above 0.9 in the partner condition).
This is consistent with women being more risk averse (Eckel and Grossmann (2008); Dohmen et al.
(2011)) and can be one possible explanation for the contradictory findings in the existing literature,
22This excludes one participant who did not answer the questionnaire and one session where questionnaire data
were not collected.
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which are usually based on one set of parameters only.
This result adds to existing evidence in the literature. Simpson (2003) has argued precisely that
the reason why existing literature on the prisoner’s dilemma has, by and large, not found gender
differences is because the presence of both temptation and risk in these games (see also Kuwabara
(2006)). To test his hypothesis, he tested for gender differences in coordination games (with TEMPT=
0) and Anti-Coordination games (with RISK= 0) and, in line with our findings, observed that women
are more cooperative than men when RISK= 0 and less cooperative when TEMPT= 0. We summarize
as follows.
Result 4 Women cooperate more than the average man if RISK is low and less if RISK is high.
There is no statistically significant gender difference on average.
6 Conclusions
We conducted a meta-study of 96 prisoner’s dilemma treatments with more than 3500 participants
across 6 countries. We focused on two dimensions of the dilemma: RISK (the percentage loss of
unilaterally cooperating against a defector) and TEMPT (the percentage gain of unilaterally defecting
against a cooperator). While RISK explains variation in cooperation rates across random matching
(“stranger”) and one-shot treatments, TEMPT and other indices explain more of the variation in
repeated interactions. These results are useful for discriminating between competing theories of why
people cooperate. For policy making, it is useful to see which dimension of the dilemma is best
targeted to yield improved cooperation rates.
Our results can also contribute to understanding seemingly conflicting results in the existing
literature. In terms of the debate on gender differences in altruism (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), we
found that women are more cooperative than the average man if risk is low, but less cooperative if
it is high. We also found that there are no gender differences on average. The levels of RISK and
TEMPT also affect the comparison between “partner” and “stranger” settings. The fact that both
these comparisons are mediated by the RISK and TEMPT measures can explain why previous literature
(usually relying on one set of parameters) has found such mixed results.
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